Normative Attitudes, Shared Intentionality, and Discursive Cognition

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F21%3A50018123" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/21:50018123 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003047483-9" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003047483-9</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003047483-9" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003047483-9</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Normative Attitudes, Shared Intentionality, and Discursive Cognition

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Discursive cognition of the sort that accompanies the grasp of a natural language involves an ability to self-govern by framing and following rules concerning what reason prescribes. In this essay I argue that the formal features of a planning semantics for the deontic and intentional modalities suggest a picture on which shared intentional mental states are a more primitive kind of cognition than that which accompanies the ability to frame and follow a rule, so that deontic cognition—and the autonomous rationality attending the ability to speak a natural language—might be understood as an evolutionary development out of the capacity to share intentions. In the course of defending this picture, I argue that it is supported by work in social psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and primatology concerning the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of norm psychology and shared intentionality in human beings.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Normative Attitudes, Shared Intentionality, and Discursive Cognition

Popis výsledku anglicky

Discursive cognition of the sort that accompanies the grasp of a natural language involves an ability to self-govern by framing and following rules concerning what reason prescribes. In this essay I argue that the formal features of a planning semantics for the deontic and intentional modalities suggest a picture on which shared intentional mental states are a more primitive kind of cognition than that which accompanies the ability to frame and follow a rule, so that deontic cognition—and the autonomous rationality attending the ability to speak a natural language—might be understood as an evolutionary development out of the capacity to share intentions. In the course of defending this picture, I argue that it is supported by work in social psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and primatology concerning the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of norm psychology and shared intentionality in human beings.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GF17-33808L" target="_blank" >GF17-33808L: Inferencializmus a kolektivní intencionalita</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The Social Institution of Discursive Norms

ISBN

978-0-367-49208-3

Počet stran výsledku

39

Strana od-do

138-176

Počet stran knihy

288

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

New York

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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