Understanding Reason: A Defense of Kantian Naturalism

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F25%3A50022214" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/25:50022214 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003336815-17" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003336815-17</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003336815-17" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003336815-17</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Understanding Reason: A Defense of Kantian Naturalism

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Developing a Kantian thought, which Wilfrid Sellars took himself to be spelling out, I present a planning semantics for two modal operators: shall and ought. On this basis, instrumental reason and the deontic or moral frame of mind are species of a genus of practical rationality. In order to model the deontic modalities as having a strong and a weak force, however, it is necessary to distinguish deontic from intentional frames of mind in ways that Sellars was not sufficiently sensitive to. And on this basis, it is possible to account for a central tenet of Kant’s view of practical reason, by explaining how a course of action is arrived at on the basis of an instru-mental practical syllogism – and so expressed with a claim about what one shall do – can also count as an exercise of deontic cognition in the recognition of what reason prescribes one ought to do. The ability to give such a tidy explanation of the unified character of practically rational cognition, as manifest in instrumental reason and the moral point of view, illustrates both the importance of formal methods in philosophical speculation and the ingenuity and insight that enlivened the philosophies of Kant and Sellars.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Understanding Reason: A Defense of Kantian Naturalism

Popis výsledku anglicky

Developing a Kantian thought, which Wilfrid Sellars took himself to be spelling out, I present a planning semantics for two modal operators: shall and ought. On this basis, instrumental reason and the deontic or moral frame of mind are species of a genus of practical rationality. In order to model the deontic modalities as having a strong and a weak force, however, it is necessary to distinguish deontic from intentional frames of mind in ways that Sellars was not sufficiently sensitive to. And on this basis, it is possible to account for a central tenet of Kant’s view of practical reason, by explaining how a course of action is arrived at on the basis of an instru-mental practical syllogism – and so expressed with a claim about what one shall do – can also count as an exercise of deontic cognition in the recognition of what reason prescribes one ought to do. The ability to give such a tidy explanation of the unified character of practically rational cognition, as manifest in instrumental reason and the moral point of view, illustrates both the importance of formal methods in philosophical speculation and the ingenuity and insight that enlivened the philosophies of Kant and Sellars.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: normy, významy a důvody ve světě přírody</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Reading Kant with Sellars: Reconceiving Kantian Themes

ISBN

978-1-03-237397-3

Počet stran výsledku

25

Strana od-do

281-305

Počet stran knihy

366

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

New York

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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