The Intermediate Set and Limiting Superdi erential for Coalition Games: Between the Core and the Weber Set

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985556%3A_____%2F17%3A00467365" target="_blank" >RIV/67985556:_____/17:00467365 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0557-3" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0557-3</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0557-3" target="_blank" >10.1007/s00182-016-0557-3</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Intermediate Set and Limiting Superdi erential for Coalition Games: Between the Core and the Weber Set

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We introduce the intermediate set as an interpolating solution concept between the core and the Weber set of a coalitional game. The new solution is de ned as the limiting superdi erential of the Lov asz extension and thus it completes the hierarchy of variational objects used to represent the core (Fr echet superdi erential) and the Weber set (Clarke superdi erential). It is shown that the intermediate set is a non-convex solution containing the Pareto optimal payo vectors that depend on some chain of coalitions and marginal coalitional contributions with respect to the chain. A detailed comparison between the intermediate set and other set-valued solutions is provided. We compute the exact form of intermediate set for all games and provide its simpli ed characterization for the simple games and the glove game.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Intermediate Set and Limiting Superdi erential for Coalition Games: Between the Core and the Weber Set

Popis výsledku anglicky

We introduce the intermediate set as an interpolating solution concept between the core and the Weber set of a coalitional game. The new solution is de ned as the limiting superdi erential of the Lov asz extension and thus it completes the hierarchy of variational objects used to represent the core (Fr echet superdi erential) and the Weber set (Clarke superdi erential). It is shown that the intermediate set is a non-convex solution containing the Pareto optimal payo vectors that depend on some chain of coalitions and marginal coalitional contributions with respect to the chain. A detailed comparison between the intermediate set and other set-valued solutions is provided. We compute the exact form of intermediate set for all games and provide its simpli ed characterization for the simple games and the glove game.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10103 - Statistics and probability

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-00735S" target="_blank" >GA15-00735S: Analýza stability optim a ekvilibrií v ekonomii</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

International Journal of Game Theory

ISSN

0020-7276

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

46

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

CH - Švýcarská konfederace

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

891-918

Kód UT WoS článku

000413759000001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84997171421