Experimental Performance of Deliberation-Aware Responder in Multi-Proposer Ultimatum Game

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985556%3A_____%2F17%3A00479459" target="_blank" >RIV/67985556:_____/17:00479459 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Experimental Performance of Deliberation-Aware Responder in Multi-Proposer Ultimatum Game

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The ultimatum game serves for studying various aspects of decision making (DM). Recently, its multi-proposer version has been modified to study the influence of deliberation costs. An optimising policy of the responder, switching between several proposers at non-negligible deliberation costs, was designed and successfully tested in a simulated environment. The policy design was done within the framework of Markov Decision Processes with rewards also allowing to model the responder’s feeling for fairness. It relies on simple Markov models of proposers, which are recursively learnt in a Bayesian way during the game course. This paper verifies, whether the gained theoretically plausible policy, suits to real-life DM. It describes experiments in which this policy was applied against human proposers. The results – with eleven groups of three independently acting proposers – confirm the soundness of this policy. It increases the responder’s economic profit due to switching between proposers, in spite of the deliberation costs and the used approximate modelling of proposers. Methodologically, it opens the possibility to learn systematically willingness of humans to spent their deliberation resources on specific DM tasks.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Experimental Performance of Deliberation-Aware Responder in Multi-Proposer Ultimatum Game

Popis výsledku anglicky

The ultimatum game serves for studying various aspects of decision making (DM). Recently, its multi-proposer version has been modified to study the influence of deliberation costs. An optimising policy of the responder, switching between several proposers at non-negligible deliberation costs, was designed and successfully tested in a simulated environment. The policy design was done within the framework of Markov Decision Processes with rewards also allowing to model the responder’s feeling for fairness. It relies on simple Markov models of proposers, which are recursively learnt in a Bayesian way during the game course. This paper verifies, whether the gained theoretically plausible policy, suits to real-life DM. It describes experiments in which this policy was applied against human proposers. The results – with eleven groups of three independently acting proposers – confirm the soundness of this policy. It increases the responder’s economic profit due to switching between proposers, in spite of the deliberation costs and the used approximate modelling of proposers. Methodologically, it opens the possibility to learn systematically willingness of humans to spent their deliberation resources on specific DM tasks.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA16-09848S" target="_blank" >GA16-09848S: Racionalita a uvažování</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the NIPS 2016 Workshop on Imperfect Decision Makers

ISBN

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ISSN

1938-7228

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

51-60

Název nakladatele

JMLR

Místo vydání

Cambridge

Místo konání akce

Barcelona

Datum konání akce

9. 12. 2016

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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