Popper and Hume: Two Great Sceptics

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F19%3A00504476" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/19:00504476 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90826-7_17" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90826-7_17</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90826-7_17" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-319-90826-7_17</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Popper and Hume: Two Great Sceptics

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Karl Popper explicitly discusses two problems in David Hume’s epistemology. He praises Hume for his critique of induction, specifically for his claim that inductive inferences are logically invalid. He rejects Hume’s psychological account of induction, specifically his theory of belief formation by repetition. Thus, Popper famously concludes that Hume buried the logical gems in the psychological mud and endorsed an irrationalist epistemology. The logical problem of induction gives Popper the impetus for spelling out his new, negative concept of reason, one which is incompatible with justification, however, Popper’s approach does not adequately deal with all the relevant themes related to Hume’s psychological problem of induction: our instinctive yearning for justification. Yet Popper and Hume have more in common than Popper explicitly acknowledges.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Popper and Hume: Two Great Sceptics

Popis výsledku anglicky

Karl Popper explicitly discusses two problems in David Hume’s epistemology. He praises Hume for his critique of induction, specifically for his claim that inductive inferences are logically invalid. He rejects Hume’s psychological account of induction, specifically his theory of belief formation by repetition. Thus, Popper famously concludes that Hume buried the logical gems in the psychological mud and endorsed an irrationalist epistemology. The logical problem of induction gives Popper the impetus for spelling out his new, negative concept of reason, one which is incompatible with justification, however, Popper’s approach does not adequately deal with all the relevant themes related to Hume’s psychological problem of induction: our instinctive yearning for justification. Yet Popper and Hume have more in common than Popper explicitly acknowledges.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie

ISBN

978-3-319-90825-0

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

207-225

Počet stran knihy

348

Název nakladatele

Palgrave Macmillan

Místo vydání

Cham

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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