Vásquez’s Anselmian Response to Wycliffian Deterministic Arguments

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F19%3A00504699" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/19:00504699 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.pdcnet.org/acpq/content/acpq_2019_0093_0002_0251_0270" target="_blank" >https://www.pdcnet.org/acpq/content/acpq_2019_0093_0002_0251_0270</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2019311175" target="_blank" >10.5840/acpq2019311175</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Vásquez’s Anselmian Response to Wycliffian Deterministic Arguments

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Gabriel Vasquez (1549-1604) discusses two deterministic arguments ascribed to John Wyclif. He appeals to the Anselmian solution based on the distinction between two types of necessity: antecedent and subsequent necessity. Unlike the former, the latter necessity does not destroy future event’s contingency, which is required if it is to result from a free choice. The paper discusses the Aristotelian objection according to which a statement describing some contingent future event is either without truth-value, and thus antecedently contingent but not (broadly) subsequently necessary at present, or it has a truth-value, but then it is not merely (broadly) subsequently necessary but also antecedently necessary. The Anselmian temporal ontology is such that no absolute present parameter is to be included in the evaluation of modal tensed statements. This recognition disposes of modal notions tied to the absolute temporal qualification of statements and thus undercuts the objection.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Vásquez’s Anselmian Response to Wycliffian Deterministic Arguments

Popis výsledku anglicky

Gabriel Vasquez (1549-1604) discusses two deterministic arguments ascribed to John Wyclif. He appeals to the Anselmian solution based on the distinction between two types of necessity: antecedent and subsequent necessity. Unlike the former, the latter necessity does not destroy future event’s contingency, which is required if it is to result from a free choice. The paper discusses the Aristotelian objection according to which a statement describing some contingent future event is either without truth-value, and thus antecedently contingent but not (broadly) subsequently necessary at present, or it has a truth-value, but then it is not merely (broadly) subsequently necessary but also antecedently necessary. The Anselmian temporal ontology is such that no absolute present parameter is to be included in the evaluation of modal tensed statements. This recognition disposes of modal notions tied to the absolute temporal qualification of statements and thus undercuts the objection.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GB14-37038G" target="_blank" >GB14-37038G: Mezi renesancí a barokem: Filosofie a vědění v českých zemích a jejich širší evropský kontext</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

ISSN

1051-3558

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

93

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

251-270

Kód UT WoS článku

000462027400005

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85065960621