Does Humanism Necessarily Imply Speciesism? The Case of Levinas’ Humanism in the Light of Herder’s

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F25%3A00638977" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/25:00638977 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.1.3294141" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.1.3294141</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EP.32.1.3294141" target="_blank" >10.2143/EP.32.1.3294141</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Does Humanism Necessarily Imply Speciesism? The Case of Levinas’ Humanism in the Light of Herder’s

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article intends to show that Levinas’ humanism does not imply speciesism. Our argument is that Levinas does not derive the sense of an ethical obligation from a pregiven concept of the human being. His defence of humanism is therefore not the expression of the idea that human beings have an exclusive moral dignity on the basis of their being human. This argument will be developed in two parts. In the first part, we situate Levinas’ humanism within the tradition of modern humanism and differentiate it from Herder’s approach in the eighteenth century, which can be considered paradigmatic for a modern concept of humanism that inevitably implies speciesism. In the second part, we argue that a metaphorical transference is at the core of Levinas’ concept of subjectivity, the appearance of which is required for the ethical sense of oneself-forthe-other. We will refer, therefore, to Levinas’ use of the metaphor of the ‘skin’ in his analyses of subjectivity and otherness in Otherwise than Being. As a result, it will be shown that the ethical sense of subjectivity does not deny but entails ‘the ambiguity of the animal’.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Does Humanism Necessarily Imply Speciesism? The Case of Levinas’ Humanism in the Light of Herder’s

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article intends to show that Levinas’ humanism does not imply speciesism. Our argument is that Levinas does not derive the sense of an ethical obligation from a pregiven concept of the human being. His defence of humanism is therefore not the expression of the idea that human beings have an exclusive moral dignity on the basis of their being human. This argument will be developed in two parts. In the first part, we situate Levinas’ humanism within the tradition of modern humanism and differentiate it from Herder’s approach in the eighteenth century, which can be considered paradigmatic for a modern concept of humanism that inevitably implies speciesism. In the second part, we argue that a metaphorical transference is at the core of Levinas’ concept of subjectivity, the appearance of which is required for the ethical sense of oneself-forthe-other. We will refer, therefore, to Levinas’ use of the metaphor of the ‘skin’ in his analyses of subjectivity and otherness in Otherwise than Being. As a result, it will be shown that the ethical sense of subjectivity does not deny but entails ‘the ambiguity of the animal’.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Ethical Perspectives

ISSN

1370-0049

e-ISSN

1783-1431

Svazek periodika

32

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

BE - Belgické království

Počet stran výsledku

23

Strana od-do

1-23

Kód UT WoS článku

001553755000001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105011147764