Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F12%3A00375264" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/12:00375264 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x" target="_blank" >10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02515.x</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In games of conflict, players typically have an incentive to exaggerate their interests. This concerns issues ranging from negotiations between political parties to conflict resolution within marriages. We experimentally study this problem using a simplevoting game where information about preferences is private. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences. The exogenous linking mechanism by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains. Repeated interaction in various settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve, leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only when players can choose their partners.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences

Popis výsledku anglicky

In games of conflict, players typically have an incentive to exaggerate their interests. This concerns issues ranging from negotiations between political parties to conflict resolution within marriages. We experimentally study this problem using a simplevoting game where information about preferences is private. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences. The exogenous linking mechanism by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains. Repeated interaction in various settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve, leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only when players can choose their partners.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Economic Journal

ISSN

0013-0133

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

122

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

563

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

32

Strana od-do

1010-1041

Kód UT WoS článku

000308289800006

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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