Contractor default: predictions, politics, and penalties in the procurement process

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F22%3A00563986" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/22:00563986 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12359" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12359</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/apce.12359" target="_blank" >10.1111/apce.12359</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Contractor default: predictions, politics, and penalties in the procurement process

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this study, we provide an analysis of federal contractor default. We examine both the predictability and the consequences of contractor default. We discover that a firm's political contributions, size, sales derived from government contracts, and primary industry concentration are positively related to default, while the average quality of firm contracts and liquidity are negatively related to default. Production of a product rather than service delivery, the number of modifications, and the requirement of a subcontractor are positively related to contract default. Department of Defense contracts and the use of commercial item procedures are negatively related to default. Defaulting firms tend to receive smaller contracts after default. To mitigate possible punishment, defaulting firms increase their political contributions, especially to congressional candidates.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Contractor default: predictions, politics, and penalties in the procurement process

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this study, we provide an analysis of federal contractor default. We examine both the predictability and the consequences of contractor default. We discover that a firm's political contributions, size, sales derived from government contracts, and primary industry concentration are positively related to default, while the average quality of firm contracts and liquidity are negatively related to default. Production of a product rather than service delivery, the number of modifications, and the requirement of a subcontractor are positively related to contract default. Department of Defense contracts and the use of commercial item procedures are negatively related to default. Defaulting firms tend to receive smaller contracts after default. To mitigate possible punishment, defaulting firms increase their political contributions, especially to congressional candidates.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

ISSN

1370-4788

e-ISSN

1467-8292

Svazek periodika

93

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

39

Strana od-do

1001-1039

Kód UT WoS článku

000719265000001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85119079564