Market Mechanism Design for Profitable On-Demand Transport Services
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F16%3A00307366" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/16:00307366 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261516302302" target="_blank" >http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261516302302</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2016.04.020" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.trb.2016.04.020</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Market Mechanism Design for Profitable On-Demand Transport Services
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
On-demand transport services in the form of dial-a-ride and taxis are crucial parts of the transport infrastructure in all major cities. However, not all on-demand transport services are equal: not-for-profit dial-a-ride services with coordinated drivers significantly differ from profit-motivated taxi services with uncoordinated drivers. In fact, there are two key threads of work on efficient scheduling, routing, and pricing for passengers: dial-a-ride services; and taxi services. Unfortunately, there has been only limited development of algorithms for joint optimization of scheduling, routing, and pricing; largely due to the widespread assumption of fixed pricing. In this paper, we introduce another thread: profit motivated on-demand transport services with coordinated drivers. To maximize provider profits and the efficiency of the service, we propose a new market mechanism for this new thread of on-demand transport services, where passengers negotiate with the service provider. In contrast to previous work, our mechanism jointly optimizes scheduling, routing, and pricing. Ultimately, we demonstrate that our approach can lead to higher profits and reduced passenger prices, compared with standard fixed price approaches, while also improving efficiency.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Market Mechanism Design for Profitable On-Demand Transport Services
Popis výsledku anglicky
On-demand transport services in the form of dial-a-ride and taxis are crucial parts of the transport infrastructure in all major cities. However, not all on-demand transport services are equal: not-for-profit dial-a-ride services with coordinated drivers significantly differ from profit-motivated taxi services with uncoordinated drivers. In fact, there are two key threads of work on efficient scheduling, routing, and pricing for passengers: dial-a-ride services; and taxi services. Unfortunately, there has been only limited development of algorithms for joint optimization of scheduling, routing, and pricing; largely due to the widespread assumption of fixed pricing. In this paper, we introduce another thread: profit motivated on-demand transport services with coordinated drivers. To maximize provider profits and the efficiency of the service, we propose a new market mechanism for this new thread of on-demand transport services, where passengers negotiate with the service provider. In contrast to previous work, our mechanism jointly optimizes scheduling, routing, and pricing. Ultimately, we demonstrate that our approach can lead to higher profits and reduced passenger prices, compared with standard fixed price approaches, while also improving efficiency.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>x</sub> - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)
CEP obor
JC - Počítačový hardware a software
OECD FORD obor
—
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/EE2.3.30.0034" target="_blank" >EE2.3.30.0034: Podpora zkvalitnění týmů výzkumu a vývoje a rozvoj intersektorální mobility na ČVUT v Praze</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2016
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
ISSN
0191-2615
e-ISSN
—
Svazek periodika
89
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
1
Stát vydavatele periodika
CH - Švýcarská konfederace
Počet stran výsledku
18
Strana od-do
178-195
Kód UT WoS článku
000379281900010
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-84966359133