Hybrid Mechanisms for On-Demand Transpor

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F19%3A00339528" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/19:00339528 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2886579" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2886579</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2018.2886579" target="_blank" >10.1109/TITS.2018.2886579</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Hybrid Mechanisms for On-Demand Transpor

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Market mechanisms are now playing a key role in the allocation and pricing of on-demand transportation services. In practice, most such services use posted-price mechanisms, where both passengers and drivers are offered a journey price which they can accept or reject. However, providers such as Liftago and GrabTaxi have begun to adopt a mechanism whereby auctions are used to price drivers. These latter mechanisms are neither posted-price nor classical double auctions and can instead be considered a hybrid mechanism. In this paper, we describe and study the properties of a novel hybrid on-demand transport mechanism. As these mechanisms require knowledge of passenger demand, we analyze the data-profit tradeoff as well as how the passenger and driver preferences influence mechanism performance. We show that the revenue loss revenue for the provider scales with root n log n for n passenger requests under a multi-armed bandit learning algorithm with beta-distributed preferences. We also investigate the effect of subsidies on both profit and the number of successful journeys allocated by the mechanism, comparing these with a posted-price mechanism, showing improvements in profit with a comparable number of successful requests.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Hybrid Mechanisms for On-Demand Transpor

Popis výsledku anglicky

Market mechanisms are now playing a key role in the allocation and pricing of on-demand transportation services. In practice, most such services use posted-price mechanisms, where both passengers and drivers are offered a journey price which they can accept or reject. However, providers such as Liftago and GrabTaxi have begun to adopt a mechanism whereby auctions are used to price drivers. These latter mechanisms are neither posted-price nor classical double auctions and can instead be considered a hybrid mechanism. In this paper, we describe and study the properties of a novel hybrid on-demand transport mechanism. As these mechanisms require knowledge of passenger demand, we analyze the data-profit tradeoff as well as how the passenger and driver preferences influence mechanism performance. We show that the revenue loss revenue for the provider scales with root n log n for n passenger requests under a multi-armed bandit learning algorithm with beta-distributed preferences. We also investigate the effect of subsidies on both profit and the number of successful journeys allocated by the mechanism, comparing these with a posted-price mechanism, showing improvements in profit with a comparable number of successful requests.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems

ISSN

1524-9050

e-ISSN

1558-0016

Svazek periodika

20

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

12

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

4500-4512

Kód UT WoS článku

000505522400020

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85077208854