A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21240%2F14%3A00221007" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21240/14:00221007 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://jair.org/papers/paper4285.html" target="_blank" >http://jair.org/papers/paper4285.html</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.4285" target="_blank" >10.1613/jair.4285</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Assume that each of n voters may or may not approve each of m issues. If an actor (the lobby) may influence up to k voters, then the central question of the NP-hard Lobbying problem is whether the lobby can choose the voters to be influenced so that as aresult each issue gets a majority of approvals. This problem can be modeled as a simple matrix modification problem: Can one set k rows of a binary n x m-matrix to all-1 rows such that each column in the resulting matrix has a majority of 1s? Significantly extending on previous work that showed parameterized intractability (W[2]-completeness) with respect to the number k of modified rows, we study how the natural parameters such n, m, k, or the "maximum number of 1s missing for any column to have a majority of 1s" (referred to as "gap value g") govern the computational complexity of Lobbying. Among other results, we prove that Lobbying is fixed-parameter tractable for parameter m and provide a greedy logarithmic-factor approximation al

Název v anglickém jazyce

A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Lobbying in Multiple Referenda

Popis výsledku anglicky

Assume that each of n voters may or may not approve each of m issues. If an actor (the lobby) may influence up to k voters, then the central question of the NP-hard Lobbying problem is whether the lobby can choose the voters to be influenced so that as aresult each issue gets a majority of approvals. This problem can be modeled as a simple matrix modification problem: Can one set k rows of a binary n x m-matrix to all-1 rows such that each column in the resulting matrix has a majority of 1s? Significantly extending on previous work that showed parameterized intractability (W[2]-completeness) with respect to the number k of modified rows, we study how the natural parameters such n, m, k, or the "maximum number of 1s missing for any column to have a majority of 1s" (referred to as "gap value g") govern the computational complexity of Lobbying. Among other results, we prove that Lobbying is fixed-parameter tractable for parameter m and provide a greedy logarithmic-factor approximation al

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

IN - Informatika

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

ISSN

1076-9757

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

50

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

—

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

38

Strana od-do

409-446

Kód UT WoS článku

000339312000001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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