Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21240%2F23%3A00366224" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21240/23:00366224 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.22" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.22</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.22" target="_blank" >10.4204/EPTCS.379.22</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function u_v depends on a generic scoring vector v, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario. As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function u_v. We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of u_v or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function u.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Popis výsledku anglicky

Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function u_v depends on a generic scoring vector v, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario. As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function u_v. We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of u_v or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function u.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 19th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2023

ISBN

—

ISSN

2075-2180

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

272-286

Název nakladatele

Open Publishing Association

Místo vydání

Sydney

Místo konání akce

Oxford

Datum konání akce

28. 6. 2023

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

001048648700023