Use of Safety Guarantees of Train Protection in the Safety of Autonomous Train Driving

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21260%2F25%3A00386137" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21260/25:00386137 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.29227/IM-2025-02-02-110" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.29227/IM-2025-02-02-110</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.29227/IM-2025-02-02-110" target="_blank" >10.29227/IM-2025-02-02-110</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Use of Safety Guarantees of Train Protection in the Safety of Autonomous Train Driving

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Autonomous train operation (defined by the on-board part of the ATO - Automatic Train Operation) is a key innovation in rail transport, bringing increased efficiency and safety. Ensuring ATO safety is a key challenge that can be addressed by integration with the European Train Control System (ETCS). This paper focuses on using ETCS safety mechanisms to ensure the safety of autonomous train control. The following paper analyses the possibility of taking over the ETCS safety guarantees into the ATO. It focuses on the different types of data provided by the ETCS, including static train data, dynamic data (movement authority, speed profile, gradient, localization, ETCS modes and traction) and information about the braking capabilities of the train. The key question is whether this information can be relied upon to implement autonomous control without additional redundant mechanisms. According to the RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety) analysis, existing safety features can be adopted if the risks corresponding to the subsystem are sufficiently reduced and there is a secure link between the ATO and the ETCS systems. The specific physical interconnection via Ethernet plays an important role here. This link is described directly in the European Railway Agency specifications. Twelve packets of information are transmitted through this link. The aim is to verify whether it is possible to take over the safety guarantees of the ETCS for the ATO and to find the interface requirements between these systems. The main requirements of the ATO functions that process the ETCS information are to stop safely at a defined location, to keep to the schedule within the conditions specified by the ETCS, to optimize the speed for efficient traction energy consumption and to start the station check-in sequence only after all safety conditions have been met. The methodology includes the analysis of the common interface between the ATO and the ETCS and applying RAMS procedures to identify and mitigate risks. The following paper describes that the ETCS provides robust safety barriers during standard train operation at GoA 1 (Grade of Automation), allowing the ATO system to rely on its safety features and focus on the additional risks associated with autonomous control at higher GoA levels. However, the key factor is to ensure a secure connection between the ATO and the ETCS in accordance with the applicable standards. This paper should contribute to a better understanding of the links between the ATO and the ETCS. It also provides important information for the further development of autonomous railway systems.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Use of Safety Guarantees of Train Protection in the Safety of Autonomous Train Driving

Popis výsledku anglicky

Autonomous train operation (defined by the on-board part of the ATO - Automatic Train Operation) is a key innovation in rail transport, bringing increased efficiency and safety. Ensuring ATO safety is a key challenge that can be addressed by integration with the European Train Control System (ETCS). This paper focuses on using ETCS safety mechanisms to ensure the safety of autonomous train control. The following paper analyses the possibility of taking over the ETCS safety guarantees into the ATO. It focuses on the different types of data provided by the ETCS, including static train data, dynamic data (movement authority, speed profile, gradient, localization, ETCS modes and traction) and information about the braking capabilities of the train. The key question is whether this information can be relied upon to implement autonomous control without additional redundant mechanisms. According to the RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety) analysis, existing safety features can be adopted if the risks corresponding to the subsystem are sufficiently reduced and there is a secure link between the ATO and the ETCS systems. The specific physical interconnection via Ethernet plays an important role here. This link is described directly in the European Railway Agency specifications. Twelve packets of information are transmitted through this link. The aim is to verify whether it is possible to take over the safety guarantees of the ETCS for the ATO and to find the interface requirements between these systems. The main requirements of the ATO functions that process the ETCS information are to stop safely at a defined location, to keep to the schedule within the conditions specified by the ETCS, to optimize the speed for efficient traction energy consumption and to start the station check-in sequence only after all safety conditions have been met. The methodology includes the analysis of the common interface between the ATO and the ETCS and applying RAMS procedures to identify and mitigate risks. The following paper describes that the ETCS provides robust safety barriers during standard train operation at GoA 1 (Grade of Automation), allowing the ATO system to rely on its safety features and focus on the additional risks associated with autonomous control at higher GoA levels. However, the key factor is to ensure a secure connection between the ATO and the ETCS in accordance with the applicable standards. This paper should contribute to a better understanding of the links between the ATO and the ETCS. It also provides important information for the further development of autonomous railway systems.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

20104 - Transport engineering

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Inżynieria Mineralna

ISSN

1640-4920

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

2

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

PL - Polská republika

Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

001697524900008

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105025125339