The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F24%3A10458562" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/24:10458562 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=701w87PTAv" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=701w87PTAv</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2023.8" target="_blank" >10.1017/XPS.2023.8</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a &quot;commitment trap&quot; for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a &quot;commitment trap&quot; for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Experimental Political Science

ISSN

2052-2649

e-ISSN

2052-2649

Svazek periodika

11

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

64-77

Kód UT WoS článku

000946791300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85150347085