Explicative and Ascriptive Justification of Human Rights

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F23%3A00140108" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/23:00140108 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.nugisfinem.org/aktuality/ratio-publica-novy-odborny-casopis-o-filozofii-a-ustavnim-pravu-v-portfoliu-nugis-finem-publishing" target="_blank" >https://www.nugisfinem.org/aktuality/ratio-publica-novy-odborny-casopis-o-filozofii-a-ustavnim-pravu-v-portfoliu-nugis-finem-publishing</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Explicative and Ascriptive Justification of Human Rights

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this article I discuss the so-called ascriptive argument developed by Tomáš Sobek in his text Explikativní zdůvodnění lidských práv. Sobek’s argument is conceived as an extension of Alexy’s explicative-existential justification of human rights. Alexy’s justification is based on the idea that whoever denies human rights within a discourse is in fact implicitly acknowledging them through their very participation in the discourse. This can be resisted by refusing to participate in the discourse and rejecting the existential part of Alexy’s argument. Sobek’s argument is based on the autonomy of choice of moral view, the effective production of which, according to ascriptivism, requires discursive participation. Alexy’s argument is thus kept going by the very fact that moral views are ascribed to the agents. Thus, while the human rights denier may refuse to discursively defend his thesis and refuse to make Alexy’s existential decision, he is unlikely to deny that he has a moral view of his own. I analyse the ascriptive argument in terms of its connection to Alexy’s argument and to discursivism more generally, and then critically contrast it with the possibility of forming one’s own moral view within an internal quasi-discourse. I also present a temporal critique of the discursive justification of human rights and reduce the impact of the ascriptive argument by presenting discursive deserters as non-autonomous in terms of their choice of moral view

Název v anglickém jazyce

Explicative and Ascriptive Justification of Human Rights

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this article I discuss the so-called ascriptive argument developed by Tomáš Sobek in his text Explikativní zdůvodnění lidských práv. Sobek’s argument is conceived as an extension of Alexy’s explicative-existential justification of human rights. Alexy’s justification is based on the idea that whoever denies human rights within a discourse is in fact implicitly acknowledging them through their very participation in the discourse. This can be resisted by refusing to participate in the discourse and rejecting the existential part of Alexy’s argument. Sobek’s argument is based on the autonomy of choice of moral view, the effective production of which, according to ascriptivism, requires discursive participation. Alexy’s argument is thus kept going by the very fact that moral views are ascribed to the agents. Thus, while the human rights denier may refuse to discursively defend his thesis and refuse to make Alexy’s existential decision, he is unlikely to deny that he has a moral view of his own. I analyse the ascriptive argument in terms of its connection to Alexy’s argument and to discursivism more generally, and then critically contrast it with the possibility of forming one’s own moral view within an internal quasi-discourse. I also present a temporal critique of the discursive justification of human rights and reduce the impact of the ascriptive argument by presenting discursive deserters as non-autonomous in terms of their choice of moral view

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Ratio Publica

ISSN

2787-9550

e-ISSN

2787-9550

Svazek periodika

3

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

66-84

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85191023482