Managing courts in competitive authoritarian regimes

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F25%3A00140624" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/25:00140624 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12286-024-00621-y.pdf" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12286-024-00621-y.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12286-024-00621-y" target="_blank" >10.1007/s12286-024-00621-y</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Managing courts in competitive authoritarian regimes

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

More than a decade of democratic backsliding has turned Hungary into a competitive authoritarian state. The government has initiated many judicial reforms to exert control over the judiciary, yet needed to maintain plausible deniability due to formal international and constitutional standards of judicial independence. Based on interviews with Hungarian judges and experts for the judicial system, we explore techniques of managing the courts. In particular we study mechanisms of co-optation and soft repression and explain why the resistance of judges was weak. We find that a complex web of informal patronal politics undermines judicial independence in practice. Moreover, the regime fosters competition between three clients who are entrusted to manage and control the judiciary: the heads of the Supreme Court (Kúria), the National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. Their resources and power ebb and flow with their reliability and performance. We conclude that competitive authoritarian regimes can maintain formally independent judicial institutions by delegating and incentivizing control over the judiciary. They thereby escape measurement, maintain plausible deniability, and evade international pressure.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Managing courts in competitive authoritarian regimes

Popis výsledku anglicky

More than a decade of democratic backsliding has turned Hungary into a competitive authoritarian state. The government has initiated many judicial reforms to exert control over the judiciary, yet needed to maintain plausible deniability due to formal international and constitutional standards of judicial independence. Based on interviews with Hungarian judges and experts for the judicial system, we explore techniques of managing the courts. In particular we study mechanisms of co-optation and soft repression and explain why the resistance of judges was weak. We find that a complex web of informal patronal politics undermines judicial independence in practice. Moreover, the regime fosters competition between three clients who are entrusted to manage and control the judiciary: the heads of the Supreme Court (Kúria), the National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. Their resources and power ebb and flow with their reliability and performance. We conclude that competitive authoritarian regimes can maintain formally independent judicial institutions by delegating and incentivizing control over the judiciary. They thereby escape measurement, maintain plausible deniability, and evade international pressure.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

ISSN

1865-2646

e-ISSN

1865-2654

Svazek periodika

18

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

CH - Švýcarská konfederace

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

381-400

Kód UT WoS článku

001395729600001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85217222407