Clarification of Discrepancies in the Classification of 1oo2 and 2oo2 Architectures Used for Safety Integrity in Land Transport

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25530%2F21%3A39918458" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25530/21:39918458 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://cmswebonline.com/esrel2021-epro/html/052.xml" target="_blank" >https://cmswebonline.com/esrel2021-epro/html/052.xml</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3850/978-981-18-2016-8_052-cd" target="_blank" >10.3850/978-981-18-2016-8_052-cd</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Clarification of Discrepancies in the Classification of 1oo2 and 2oo2 Architectures Used for Safety Integrity in Land Transport

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Automated car driving or advanced railway signaling systems are based on the safe vehicle position determination. The required safety integrity of the positioning function cannot be achieved using a single element, and therefore a combination of information from several diverse sensors should be used – e.g. within the 1oo2 (one-out-of-two) or 2oo2 (two-out-of-two) architecture. The standard IEC 61508 says that the 1oo2 architecture is intended for safety integrity and 2oo2 for availability. On the other hand, the railway standard EN 50129 says that 2oo2 is used for integrity – quite the opposite. So where is the truth? The purpose of the contribution is to clarify the above discrepancies. The paper begins with the classification of safety systems as ‘safety-critical’ and ‘safety-related’ and examines the possible impact of system classification on system properties depending on the area of application. Then, the basic safety parameters of dualchannel architectures for safety integrity are presented using two examples with Markov modelling. The main differences between 1oo2 and 2oo2 architectures used for safety integrity are explained. Finally, the equations concerning the safety parameters contained in the automotive standard ISO 26262-10 for a dual-channel architecture are verified using rail safety experience. Recommendations for the safety architecture design for self-driving cars are given, which are based on the numerical results obtained in the examples.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Clarification of Discrepancies in the Classification of 1oo2 and 2oo2 Architectures Used for Safety Integrity in Land Transport

Popis výsledku anglicky

Automated car driving or advanced railway signaling systems are based on the safe vehicle position determination. The required safety integrity of the positioning function cannot be achieved using a single element, and therefore a combination of information from several diverse sensors should be used – e.g. within the 1oo2 (one-out-of-two) or 2oo2 (two-out-of-two) architecture. The standard IEC 61508 says that the 1oo2 architecture is intended for safety integrity and 2oo2 for availability. On the other hand, the railway standard EN 50129 says that 2oo2 is used for integrity – quite the opposite. So where is the truth? The purpose of the contribution is to clarify the above discrepancies. The paper begins with the classification of safety systems as ‘safety-critical’ and ‘safety-related’ and examines the possible impact of system classification on system properties depending on the area of application. Then, the basic safety parameters of dualchannel architectures for safety integrity are presented using two examples with Markov modelling. The main differences between 1oo2 and 2oo2 architectures used for safety integrity are explained. Finally, the equations concerning the safety parameters contained in the automotive standard ISO 26262-10 for a dual-channel architecture are verified using rail safety experience. Recommendations for the safety architecture design for self-driving cars are given, which are based on the numerical results obtained in the examples.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

20202 - Communication engineering and systems

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF17_049%2F0008394" target="_blank" >EF17_049/0008394: Spolupráce Univerzity Pardubice a aplikační sféry v aplikačně orientovaném výzkumu lokačních, detekčních a simulačních systémů pro dopravní a přepravní procesy (PosiTrans)</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 31st European Safety and Reliability Conference

ISBN

978-981-18201-6-8

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

8

Strana od-do

1272-1279

Název nakladatele

Research Publishing Services

Místo vydání

Singapore

Místo konání akce

Angers

Datum konání akce

19. 9. 2021

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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