Searle on the Unity of the World

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Searle on the Unity of the World

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true-"the world is one". The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle's defence of the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility is unsuccessful.Third, I defend Nagel's argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle's objections to it.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Searle on the Unity of the World

Popis výsledku anglicky

According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true-"the world is one". The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle's defence of the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility is unsuccessful.Third, I defend Nagel's argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle's objections to it.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2007

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Axiomathes

ISSN

1122-1151

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

17

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

11

Strana od-do

41-51

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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