Searle on Emergence

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Searle on Emergence

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Searle's conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle?s conception of emergence.First, I try to show that Searle?s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle?s distinction between explanation and deduction of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness. At the end I try to show in what senseis Searle?s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Searle on Emergence

Popis výsledku anglicky

Searle's conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle?s conception of emergence.First, I try to show that Searle?s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle?s distinction between explanation and deduction of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness. At the end I try to show in what senseis Searle?s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Organon F

ISSN

1335-0668

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

19

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

Supp.2

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

40-48

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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