How Does Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe Hurt Economic Growth? Granger Test of Causality

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F13%3A00200389" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/13:00200389 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.ekonom.sav.sk/sk/casopis/rocnik/6-2013" target="_blank" >http://www.ekonom.sav.sk/sk/casopis/rocnik/6-2013</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

How Does Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe Hurt Economic Growth? Granger Test of Causality

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

How does corruption in Central and Eastern Europe hurt economic growth? The paper explains theoretical framework that is applied to the problem of corruption and reveals its application difficulties. Corruption may be understood as the problem of agency,which is the problem of coordination between principal and agent that is solved through the enforceable system of property rights, or as the problem of rent-seeking addressing the problem of rules motivating entrepreneurs to corrupt behaviour. Within comparison of both agency theory and rent-seeking we argue that corruption in general is the problem of legal setting and its enforcement and, if badly established, it does not promote economic growth. To verify the theoretical argument we present empirical test showing whether corruption hurts or not economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose we use Granger causality test to demonstrate that corruption precedes economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe which means

Název v anglickém jazyce

How Does Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe Hurt Economic Growth? Granger Test of Causality

Popis výsledku anglicky

How does corruption in Central and Eastern Europe hurt economic growth? The paper explains theoretical framework that is applied to the problem of corruption and reveals its application difficulties. Corruption may be understood as the problem of agency,which is the problem of coordination between principal and agent that is solved through the enforceable system of property rights, or as the problem of rent-seeking addressing the problem of rules motivating entrepreneurs to corrupt behaviour. Within comparison of both agency theory and rent-seeking we argue that corruption in general is the problem of legal setting and its enforcement and, if badly established, it does not promote economic growth. To verify the theoretical argument we present empirical test showing whether corruption hurts or not economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose we use Granger causality test to demonstrate that corruption precedes economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe which means

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/7E12049" target="_blank" >7E12049: Welfare, Wealth and Work for Europe</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Ekonomicky Casopis

ISSN

0013-3035

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

61

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

6

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

563-577

Kód UT WoS článku

324602300002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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