Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Among board games, Pexeso (Concentration game) for two players is a game almost purely output-oriented, i.e. the optimal play is not given by strategic plans with long-term horizon (e.g. no short-term tactical sacrifice is observed). So, the optimal strategy and game dynamics may be calculated almost analytically, assuming a given rationality restrictions of the players. In the paper, the optimal strategy for two players is solved using dynamic programming. Further, it is proved that for rational players, the game would end with stalemate (the game never ends) with a probability close to 1. Further, the game dynamics is described if a rationality restriction is given such that the players perform a random move instead of the optimal one with probabilities P,Q > 0. In this case, the probability of a stalemate is equal to zero.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models

Popis výsledku anglicky

Among board games, Pexeso (Concentration game) for two players is a game almost purely output-oriented, i.e. the optimal play is not given by strategic plans with long-term horizon (e.g. no short-term tactical sacrifice is observed). So, the optimal strategy and game dynamics may be calculated almost analytically, assuming a given rationality restrictions of the players. In the paper, the optimal strategy for two players is solved using dynamic programming. Further, it is proved that for rational players, the game would end with stalemate (the game never ends) with a probability close to 1. Further, the game dynamics is described if a rationality restriction is given such that the players perform a random move instead of the optimal one with probabilities P,Q > 0. In this case, the probability of a stalemate is equal to zero.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GD402%2F09%2FH045" target="_blank" >GD402/09/H045: Nelineární dynamika v peněžní ekonomii a financích. Teorie a empirické modely.</a><br>

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2010

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics 2010

ISBN

978-80-7394-218-2

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

4

Strana od-do

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Název nakladatele

University of South Bohemia

Místo vydání

České Budějovice

Místo konání akce

České Budějovice

Datum konání akce

8. 9. 2010

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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