Simple market equilibria with rationally inattentive consumers

Popis výsledku

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Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Simple market equilibria with rationally inattentive consumers
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
We study a market with rationally inattentive consumers who are unsure of the terms of the offers made by firms, but can acquire information about the terms at a cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price set by firms is continuously increasing in the cost of information for consumers and decreasing in the number of firms operating. In addition, favorable a priori information about a firm leads it to set a higher price, and a new entrant can increase demand for incumbents. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of information, firms selling low-quality products may choose to set the highest prices.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Simple market equilibria with rationally inattentive consumers
Popis výsledku anglicky
We study a market with rationally inattentive consumers who are unsure of the terms of the offers made by firms, but can acquire information about the terms at a cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price set by firms is continuously increasing in the cost of information for consumers and decreasing in the number of firms operating. In addition, favorable a priori information about a firm leads it to set a higher price, and a new entrant can increase demand for incumbents. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of information, firms selling low-quality products may choose to set the highest prices.

Projekt
GPP402/11/P236: Implikace racionální nepozornosti
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění
2012
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Druh výsledku

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

J_x

CEP

AH - Ekonomie

Rok uplatnění

2012