Solving a cooperative project scheduling with controllable processing times, self-interested agents and equal profit sharing

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Solving a cooperative project scheduling with controllable processing times, self-interested agents and equal profit sharing

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper considers a cooperative project that involves a set of self-interested agents, each in charge of a part of the project. An agent can reduce the duration of the activities he is responsible for, by gathering extra-resources, at a given cost. Ifthe overall project ends earlier than expected, the client offers a reward to be shared equally among agents. The nancial outcome for each agent therefore depends on all agents decisions and on the satisfaction of the customer, which is function of theproject makespan. Under these assumptions, we address the problem of nding a Nash equi-librium, ensuring the stability of the schedule, that minimizes the project makespan. We explain how this problem, which is NP-hard, can be eciently modeled and solvedwith mixed integer linear programming.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Solving a cooperative project scheduling with controllable processing times, self-interested agents and equal profit sharing

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper considers a cooperative project that involves a set of self-interested agents, each in charge of a part of the project. An agent can reduce the duration of the activities he is responsible for, by gathering extra-resources, at a given cost. Ifthe overall project ends earlier than expected, the client offers a reward to be shared equally among agents. The nancial outcome for each agent therefore depends on all agents decisions and on the satisfaction of the customer, which is function of theproject makespan. Under these assumptions, we address the problem of nding a Nash equi-librium, ensuring the stability of the schedule, that minimizes the project makespan. We explain how this problem, which is NP-hard, can be eciently modeled and solvedwith mixed integer linear programming.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

BB - Aplikovaná statistika, operační výzkum

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 6th Multidisciplinary International Conference on Scheduling: Theory and Applications

ISBN

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ISSN

2305-249X

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

8

Strana od-do

125-132

Název nakladatele

University of Nottingham

Místo vydání

Nottingham

Místo konání akce

Gent

Datum konání akce

27. 8. 2013

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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