Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F17%3A00311298" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/17:00311298 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10951-017-0516-2" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10951-017-0516-2</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10951-017-0516-2" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10951-017-0516-2</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Large projects often involve a set of contractors, each in charge of a part of the project. In this paper, we assume that every contractor is self-interested and can control the duration of his/her activities, which can be shortened up to an incompressible limit, by gathering extra resources at a given cost. In this context, the resulting project makespan depends on all the contractors’ decisions. The customer of the project is interested in a short project makespan and offers a reward, proportional to the project makespan reduction, to be shared by the contractors. In practice, either the reward sharing policy results from an upfront agreement or payments are freely allocated by the customer. Each contractor is only interested in the maximization of his/her profit and behaves accordingly. This paper addresses the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium and a sharing policy that minimize the project makespan. The aim is to help the customer to determine the duration of the activities and the reward sharing policy such that no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from this solution. We show that this problem is NP-hard and how it can be modeled and solved by mixed integer linear programming. Computational analysis on large instances proves the effectiveness of our approach. Based on an empirical investigation of the influence of reward sharing policies on the project makespan, the paper provides new insight into how a project’s customer should offer rewards to the contractors.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem

Popis výsledku anglicky

Large projects often involve a set of contractors, each in charge of a part of the project. In this paper, we assume that every contractor is self-interested and can control the duration of his/her activities, which can be shortened up to an incompressible limit, by gathering extra resources at a given cost. In this context, the resulting project makespan depends on all the contractors’ decisions. The customer of the project is interested in a short project makespan and offers a reward, proportional to the project makespan reduction, to be shared by the contractors. In practice, either the reward sharing policy results from an upfront agreement or payments are freely allocated by the customer. Each contractor is only interested in the maximization of his/her profit and behaves accordingly. This paper addresses the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium and a sharing policy that minimize the project makespan. The aim is to help the customer to determine the duration of the activities and the reward sharing policy such that no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from this solution. We show that this problem is NP-hard and how it can be modeled and solved by mixed integer linear programming. Computational analysis on large instances proves the effectiveness of our approach. Based on an empirical investigation of the influence of reward sharing policies on the project makespan, the paper provides new insight into how a project’s customer should offer rewards to the contractors.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA16-23509S" target="_blank" >GA16-23509S: Flexibilní rozvrhovací a optimalizační algoritmy pro distribuované systémy reálného času</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Scheduling

ISSN

1094-6136

e-ISSN

1099-1425

Svazek periodika

20

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

475-491

Kód UT WoS článku

000412544900004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85015958906