Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21730%2F21%3A00347098" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21730/21:00347098 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.01.023" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.01.023</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.01.023" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ejor.2021.01.023</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper addresses a project scheduling environment in which the activities are partitioned among a set of agents. The project owner is interested in completing the project as soon as possible. Therefore, she/he defines rewards and penalties to stimulate the agents to complete the project faster. The project owner offers a per-day reward for early project completion and defines intermediate project milestones to be met within specific due dates, with associated per-day penalties. Each agent can, therefore, decide the duration of her/his activities, taking into account linear activity crashing costs, the reward for early project completion, and the penalty arising from violating milestone due-dates. We consider Nash equilibria, i.e., situations in which no agent has an interest in individually changing the duration of any of her/his activities, and in particular, the problem of finding a minimum-makespan equilibrium. This problem is known to be NP-hard, and in this paper, we (i) propose a new and efficient exact algorithmic approach for finding the minimum-makespan equilibrium and (ii) through an extensive computational campaign we evaluate the role played by milestones in driving the project towards the owner’s goal.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper addresses a project scheduling environment in which the activities are partitioned among a set of agents. The project owner is interested in completing the project as soon as possible. Therefore, she/he defines rewards and penalties to stimulate the agents to complete the project faster. The project owner offers a per-day reward for early project completion and defines intermediate project milestones to be met within specific due dates, with associated per-day penalties. Each agent can, therefore, decide the duration of her/his activities, taking into account linear activity crashing costs, the reward for early project completion, and the penalty arising from violating milestone due-dates. We consider Nash equilibria, i.e., situations in which no agent has an interest in individually changing the duration of any of her/his activities, and in particular, the problem of finding a minimum-makespan equilibrium. This problem is known to be NP-hard, and in this paper, we (i) propose a new and efficient exact algorithmic approach for finding the minimum-makespan equilibrium and (ii) through an extensive computational campaign we evaluate the role played by milestones in driving the project towards the owner’s goal.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF15_003%2F0000466" target="_blank" >EF15_003/0000466: Umělá inteligence a uvažování</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Journal of Operational Research

ISSN

0377-2217

e-ISSN

1872-6860

Svazek periodika

294

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

29-41

Kód UT WoS článku

000651778500004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85101082126