Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F15%3A00221582" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/15:00221582 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10951-014-0393-x" target="_blank" >http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10951-014-0393-x</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10951-014-0393-x" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10951-014-0393-x</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper considers a project scheduling environment in which the activities of the project network are partitioned among a set of agents. Activity durations are controllable, i.e., every agent is allowed to shorten the duration of its activities, incurring a crashing cost. If the project makespan is reduced with respect to its normal value, a reward is offered to the agents and each agent receives a given ratio of the total reward. Agents want to maximize their profit. Assuming a complete knowledge ofthe agents? parameters and of the activity network, this problem is modeled as a non-cooperative game and Nash equilibria are analyzed. We characterize Nash equilibria in terms of the existence of certain types of cuts on the project network. We show that finding one Nash equilibrium is easy, while finding a Nash strategy that minimizes the project makespan is NP-hard in the strong sense. The particular case where each activity belongs to a different agent is also studied and some polyn

Název v anglickém jazyce

Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper considers a project scheduling environment in which the activities of the project network are partitioned among a set of agents. Activity durations are controllable, i.e., every agent is allowed to shorten the duration of its activities, incurring a crashing cost. If the project makespan is reduced with respect to its normal value, a reward is offered to the agents and each agent receives a given ratio of the total reward. Agents want to maximize their profit. Assuming a complete knowledge ofthe agents? parameters and of the activity network, this problem is modeled as a non-cooperative game and Nash equilibria are analyzed. We characterize Nash equilibria in terms of the existence of certain types of cuts on the project network. We show that finding one Nash equilibrium is easy, while finding a Nash strategy that minimizes the project makespan is NP-hard in the strong sense. The particular case where each activity belongs to a different agent is also studied and some polyn

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

BB - Aplikovaná statistika, operační výzkum

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Scheduling

ISSN

1094-6136

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

18

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

15-27

Kód UT WoS článku

000347896300003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84926613251